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Companies tend to adopt security approaches that align with some subset of the four categories of IS security techniques -
checklists, risk analysis, formal methods and soft modeling. To develop a structure of secure IS that upholds confidentiality,
integrity and availability of information there remains a need for an integral security model that incorporates the benefits of
other security designs outside the chosen ones. Organizations demand security models that cater to their unique operational
characteristics. The paper uses the deep-structure model of Wand and Weber (1990) to help reveal the deep structure
characteristics of IS security using three models -  representational model identifies subsystems within an organization; state-
tracking model ensures security changes trace real world security system changes; and decomposition model defines specific
external events that are stimuli to changes on internal events.  A conceptual security model is presented that manifests the
meaning of dynamic, custom-fit and flexible IS security structure which also incorporates features from checklists, risk
analysis, soft modeling and formal methods.
Keywords
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INTRODUCTION
Just as deep structure of an information system comprises those properties that manifest the meaning of real-world systems
that the information system is intended to model, the deep structure of IS security should comprise those properties that
manifest as the meaning of security that a secure IS model is intended to model. In an organizational setting where growth is
accompanied by normal operational disruptions and confusions, the only means to accomplish a secure IS that upholds
confidentiality, integrity and availability (Bishop, 2002) is to develop a structure of IS security that is adaptive and flexible to
reorganize itself with the changing environment of the organization and the behavior of the actors involved. In some sense,
this implies that an effective IS security model is one that is dynamic, predictive and preventive to counter any internal or
external security threats to the organization.
To accomplish these goals, this paper describes three interconnected models that describe IS security deep-structure. The
deep-structure properties are in alignment with the three models proposed by Wand and Weber (1990) and seeks to facilitate
the analysis, design and implementation of a faithful IS security design model. This paper is motivated by the premise that a
deep rooted analysis of IS security will help to reveal the deep-structure characteristics of IS security in a way that it models
real expectations of information security. Furthermore, a concrete study will also help to naturally identify the forces that
hold the components together and influence the holistic behavior of the security model under varying internal and external
events. A conceptual model of this form will help to formulate an IS security design that will faithfully track the security
events in the real world and propagate pertinent and requisite changes to all coupled components which in turn will most
effectively ensure confidentiality, integrity and availability of information to the users. The model proposed in this paper is
based on defining Information Systems security as the protection of information resources of a firm, where such protection
could be through technical means and by establishing adequate procedures, management controls and managing the behavior
of people (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006) and focuses only on the deep-structure of IS security.
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OVERVIEW OF IS SECURITY DESIGN MODELS
Numerous attempts have been made to grapple with the challenges of establishing a secure information system. Research in
the  area  of  IS  security  can  be  classified  into  one  of  four  categories:  checklists,  risk  analysis,  formal  methods  and  soft
modeling techniques (Dhillon and Torkzadeh, 2006; Siponen, 2001; Backhouse and Dhillon, 1996).
Checklists provide a security evaluation guide without addressing the key task of understanding the substantive questions of
security in the given organizational context. Risk analysis portray the correspondence between risk and vulnerability and
helps IS managers to justify the cost of IS security implementation and control. Critics of risk analysis methods question the
use of probability theory to assess security risks. Formal methods, on the other hand, are discrete event-oriented approaches
whose origin can be traced to application in military environment. They derive solutions by abstraction of the problem and
the solution space (Baskerville, 1993). The Bell La Pedula Model and the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation Criteria are
examples of formal methods of IS security design. The highly structured approach makes them limited in long term
usefulness. Soft modeling design methods that rely on social theories to study security issues have gained significant
attention in recent years. They help to attain a holistic view of the problem domain that is lacking in all prior design methods
that have been proposed. Although soft modeling methods help to recognize the importance of a changing organizational
context, including with the role of human and social attributes, they are limited in prescriptive components and orient towards
offering complex philosophical and sociological explanation to security problems (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001).
All of the above security modeling techniques offer unique features that are vital in establishing an impregnable security
solution.  However,  none  of  the  methods  on  their  own  have  guaranteed  a  fully  anchored  Information  System  security  as
evidenced by the lack of large scale adoption of any one of the design techniques in the practitioner world.  The validation of
the argument is an easy task. There is little doubt that IS security implemented as a set of items crossed out from a checklist
is any more effective than using risk analysis that weighs security costs to expected benefits. Neither is the use of formal
controls to derive effective solutions by abstraction of the problem and solution space (Baskerville, 1993) more effective than
soft modeling techniques that recognize the importance of changing organizational context, human and social attributes. The
underlying problem is not really a lack of rigidity in each of the propositions, but rather a completeness that fail to include the
benefits of other security design models besides those offered from within themselves.
The classic definition of IS security is conceived on the notion of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability (CIA) of data
(Bishop, 2002). Confidentiality refers to limiting data access to authorized users through authentication methods and controls.
Integrity implies the ability to preserve trustworthiness of the information resources by ensuring that changes are not made
inappropriately. Equally critical is Availability, which refers to the fact that the information sources actually remain available,
since unavailability is as good as having no information at all. Although CIA is a widely used benchmark for evaluating
information systems security (Magnusson and Yngstrom, 2004), it is highly restrictive and the golden goose for successfully
managing information security is to also inculcate principles of Responsibility, Integrity, Trust and Ethicality (RITE) into
organizational minds. Responsibility insures duty (or obligation) to the sphere of activities that surround work practices and
events that defines an organization’s sense of security. Integrity is the requirement of membership that upholds steadfast
adherence to ethical code of conduct and Trust can be defined as the cohesive element that binds work force to institutions
especially when organizations rely on information assurance to effectively sustain and strengthen itself. Ethicality embodies
what is right and wrong in the conduct of endorsing information security. It refers to the informal norms and behaviors which
are not explicitly stated as company rules that can be applied to all formalized procedures. While CIA is mostly
operationalized through technical aptitude, RITE principles evoke a strong social imprint. Gladly, in the communal space of
IS security research, the dire necessity of CIA and the invisible forces of RITE have not gone unnoticed. The outcome has
been a renewed call for inquiry into IS security research that aims to combine CIA with the principles of RITE (Dhillon and
Backhouse, 2000). The importance of this problem has been vocalized loudly in the hope that there is some means by which
organizations will be sufficiently prepared with the right IS security model – a model that is suited to the individual
characteristics of the environmental dynamics in which they operate.
Companies tend to adopt security approaches that are more or less in alignment with any one of the four prominent
representations of IS security design models. Organizational settings that focus on using social theories in understanding
security issues have inherently higher benefits attained by gaining a holistic view of the problem domain. However, they lack
in prescriptive components and tend to focus on explanations that are enshrouded in complex philosophical and sociological
bases (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2000) Information Systems security will forever remain inadequate under any circumstances
that fail to encapsulate the sociological, technical, well-defined internal events and specific external components that shape
the functioning of an organization. The reality is that, even today it is not uncommon to come across companies that seek to
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accomplish IS security through a set of checklist items and some related hardware and software installation. Irrespective of
whether such seemingly uninformed IS security solutions is due to the lack of attention, unawareness or optimistic biases,
there remains a strong need to develop a security model that manifests the meaning of what constitutes dynamic, flexible and
predictive IS security design model.
One plausible way to realize this manifestation is homologous to the way marine biologists study unfamiliar deep sea
territories through deep sea diving expeditions. Just as a diver would conduct observational investigation of the depths of the
ocean and assemble the outcome of the observations on return to the surface, the researcher can attempt to identify the deep
structures of organizational IS security, where observations of the subcomponents can be harmonized as an interpretation of
what constitutes real IS security. Decomposing the aggregate into its sub-components, analyzing the components at a
granular level and weaving the relationships that unify the components at an organizational level will enable the development
of a precision fabricated IS security design model that is consistent with the social expectations and in concordance with the
internal and external events in which the organization ultimately functions.
Wand and Weber (1990) uses the deep-structure model to characterize Information Systems in a similar manner. The concept
of deep structure is not really new to the field of IS. Deep-structure was originally proposed by Noam Chomsky as a means to
explain the notion of rules and generative grammar used in linguistics to explain the process of organizing (Truex and
Baskerville, 1998). This notion, borrowed from linguistics, has been used to characterize the process of organizing the
surface, deep and physical structure of information systems. Leifer (1994) uses deep-structures to elicit knowledge that
escapes systems designers by analyzing knowledge types and task characteristics. Wand and Weber (1990) adopts an
approach where they regard surface-structure as the interface between the information system and its users and
organizational environment. The deep-structure captures the essence of the real world systems that the information system is
intended to model and physical-structure manifest the technology used to implement the system. Furthermore, by adorning
deep-structure as the window to the soul, they seek to reveal the behavior and the fabric of interaction in what constitutes a
‘good’ information system (Wand and Weber, 1990). They define the properties of deep-structure by using three models –
the representational model, the state-tracking model and the decomposition model.
The same deep-structure approach can be successfully applied to capture the essence of what truly characterizes IS security.
A deep analysis of the components of IS security can also be realized by using the representational, state-tracking and
decomposition models proposed by Wand and Weber. The models can be used to describe the ontological constructs and the
grammar that manifest real world security system. The relationships between the models will describe how changes in one
invoke correlative changes in other sub-components. In many ways, this is akin to a web of interactions where concepts from
the four individual IS security design methods is solicited to create a comprehensive bubble or an integral completeness, that
is currently lacking in each of individual IS security models. Naturally, in this web of interaction, the relationships between
the models play a vital role. Failure to address the role of relationships is arguably the root cause of deficiencies and
inaptitude in the IS security models.
THE FRAMEWORK
Chomsky (1967) intended to use the concept of deep structures for evaluating spoken languages and related grammar.
Application of deep structure principles for the analysis of Information Systems properties evolved from recognizing the
problem associated with capturing the true meaning of information systems (Wand and Weber, 1990; Leifer, 1994). The
framework used in this paper borrows heavily from the formal deep-structure model (consisting of the representational
model, the state-tracking model and the decomposition model) proposed by Wand and Weber (1990). Wand and Weber use
representational model to generate scripts that describe the structure and behavior of a real-world system. The state-tracking
model engages in helping reveal whether the information system truly tracks the real-world system that it is intended to
model. The model accomplishes this using four necessary and sufficient conditions – mapping requirement, tracking
requirement, reporting requirement and sequencing requirement. Finally the decomposition model is used by Wand and
Weber to define the static and dynamic nature of events (both internal and external) and their state (stable or unstable) of
existence. The deep-structure framework applied to IS security can be conceptually mapped as shown in figure 1.
Representational Model:
The deep structure interpretation of real world IS security consists of describing the elements and subsystems that are
sufficient and necessary to establish a secure information system. The ontological constructs in the representational model
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enable us to identify the properties and requirements of all components that facilitate the development of a high level security
mechanism in a way that satisfies the end user and the organization while also being effective and efficient in the given
organizational context (Markotten, 2000). The ontological formalisms for describing the representational model of
information security can be developed by extending the construct proposed by Bunge (1977, 1979). Developing these
constructs for the security model is an ongoing research issue. The representation model is not the actual security software or
hardware, but an ontological formalism that defines the structure and behavior of ideal real world IS security system. The
formalism can be cast into implementations of security techniques (such as cryptographic methods, security monitoring
devices) using the physical structure.
Figure 1. The Conceptual map of IS security deep structures
State-tracking Model:
The state-tracking model actively seeks to follow the footprints of the real world IS security that it intends to model. Wand
and Weber specifies four necessary and sufficient conditions for an information system to faithfully track the real world
system. These conditions ensure completeness of the IS security model and help to evaluate the congruence of the model to
the real world. Organizations thrive by seeking equilibrium with their environment. Correspondingly as the environment
changes and evolves, the consequences also affect the organizations. This is similar to what biologists would refer to as co-
evolution (Wheatley, 1999). Modeling an IS security system that is heavily structured and rigid will severely constrain the IS
security from adapting to fluctuations within the organization and changes in the environment. Higher levels of resiliency and
coherence to changes in the real world are requirements in a security model if organizations are to feel unthreatened while
operating in the midst of an environment that is unpredictable and susceptible to constant flux. No single IS security model
adequately addresses the effect of changing environmental states on the organization and vice versa. An effective IS security
model should incorporate features from checklists, risk analysis, soft modeling and formal methods to ensure checks and
balances that address such changes. This may come across as a ‘porridge of security being’ and is precisely what the state-
tracking model seeks to handle. The goal of the state-tracking model is to track the changes and enable organizations to
undertake an agile and responsive security policy development strategy.
Four necessary conditions hold for the state-tracking model. These conditions are closely related but amended versions of
those proposed by Wand and Weber.
Requirement 1: A one-to-many mapping must exist from the set of real-world security system states into the set of IS security
states.
This corresponds to the mapping requirement that when satisfied ensures that at least one IS security state exists for every
real-world security state.
Requirement 2: When the real-world security changes state, the IS security must be able to change from a state that
corresponds to the initial real-world security state to a state that corresponds to the subsequent real-world security state.
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This is the tracking requirement to ensure that IS security model responds to state changes in a manner corresponding to the
security incident changes in the real-world system.
Requirement 3: If an external event occurs in the real-world security system, an external (input) event that is a faithful
representation of the real-world external event must occur in the IS security model.
This reporting requirement warrants that any IS security external event is an accurate and complete representation
of the real-world security external system security event. Although the real world security event may not necessarily affect
the organization, the IS security design should be aware that this external event occurs in the real world.
Requirement 4:  The order in which external events occur in the IS security model must be the same as the order in which
external events represented by these IS security system external events occur in the real world system.
This is the sequencing requirement  to  ensure  that  the  IS  security  model  does  not  loose  track  of  the  real  world  IS
security states because external events are not occurring in the IS security model in the correct order.
The requirements are not intended to enforce control, but enable dynamic connectedness that match the features from
checklists, risk analysis, formal methods and soft modeling.
Decomposition Model:
The decomposition model breaks down IS security structure into architectural sub-systems that allow a fine-grained view of
individual components and their security requirements. The decomposition model defines all specified external events and
well-defined internal events. The reality is that, there exists a strong interaction between the organization and the
environment. Describing the direct and indirect influence of the internal and external events and the propagation of the effects
to all other interconnected sub-components is the goal of the decomposition model. This opens the potential for predictability
and planning in the IS security model in a way that helps to attain the integral completeness in the conceptual design.
Figure 2. Applying the Deep Structure Model of IS Security.
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In order to demonstrate the nature of the model, consider an external event, such as a questionable sequence of packets
identified by a well known attack pattern logged at the intrusion detection system of the organization. This external event can
act as a stimulus to one or more of the sub-systems of the organization. The sequence of packets in question evokes a
response, an internal event, from the security gatekeeper of the affected subsystems. The gatekeeper, in turn could alert the
caretakers of other critical functional units (or subsystems) of the company that are vulnerable to the threat. This reflects the
indirect effect of changes in one subsystem on other subsystems. The sequence of events, starting with the external event (a
plausible attack) from which new information is spawned (detecting the attack source), followed by generation of new
meaning (identifying the attack source) and subsequently conveying warning messages to other functional units, illustrates
the interaction and reflective conversation among different subsystems of the organization. The set of interactions resulting
from the external and internal events can be decomposed and represented as shown in figure 2.
The importance of interrelationships between the architectural spaces that form the overall system cannot be undermined. The
internal events may either be well or poorly defined. Well defined internal events are predicable state changes of subsystems
based on specific external events. Poorly defined internal events are outcomes of unexpected subsystem state changes due to
unspecified external events. Although unspecific external events can stir things up and roil the pot, causing service disruption
and confusion, they create new information for the state tracking model. This new information is the very substance that
draws together the features from checklists, risk analysis, formal methods and soft modeling, creating a communal space of
interacting influences and invisible forces allowing continuous growth and change to the security preparedness model of the
organization. While checklists and risk analysis help prevention, prediction, risk assessment and monitoring, formal methods
assist with planning and establishing rules for adequate checks and balances. Soft modeling enables internal monitoring,
generates security literacy among employees, places normative controls, allows information monitoring and lays down a
strong accountability and responsibility structure (Dhillon, 2001).
AN EXAMPLE
The description of a conceptual model can sound teasing and enticing in many ways until it is validated or falsified
otherwise. Although a real world validation is the preferred choice for any research, analyzing the application of the
conceptual model as it applies to a real world scenario can be equally invigorating. For the sake of clarifying the use of the
conceptual model (in addition to the example in the previous section), consider the following email notification sent by the
security manager at an organization with approximately 13000 employees, a week prior to the date mentioned.
An email worm known as BlackWorm/Nyxem/Blackmal/Blueworm/Grew is scheduled to
delete (actually overwrite with a small text message) certain file types on
Feb 3, 2006. Microsoft sees this threat as low but it's always good to be
aware. Make sure your virus definitions are up to date.
Although the intent of the email message is to warn users about an impeding attack in the future, the message is vague, the
events are poorly defined and specified preventive steps lack any purpose. Even the name of the impending virus has no real
meaning to a normal computer user. Checklists and risk analysis provide no additional clarity to the message related to the
probable incident in the future. Dealing with an unspecified external event of this nature is a hard security situation at hand
for any organization. Once the external environment has gained adequate awareness of the incident, which in most cases is
long after the incident has occurred, useful knowledge is made publicly available from security response teams like
CERT/CC or CIS (see references 6,8,16 and 18). This new information is reactive in nature but can strengthen existing
checklists and risk analysis approaches to protect against future attacks of similar nature. It is also important to note that
organizations that are the first victims are faced with a crisis and whatever adverse consequences the problem portends, are
therefore inescapable after the threshold of response timeliness has passed.  Unspecified external events, however, need not
necessarily leave an organization in the dark. The email warning in this case serves value through the use of formal methods
and soft modeling. Internal events triggered from the external stimuli include adapting existing rules as precautions or adding
new formal rules to proactively curtail the effects when (or if) the external event is incident to the overall system. In addition
to use of formal methods, soft modeling can mitigate risk through immediate internal controls and reasonably assure that
control objectives are being met.  Soft modeling can also impose external controls to audit the requisite behavioral changes
needed to cope with the formal rules and define the role of responsibility structures. Combining features from the four models
manifest into reflections of expected agility and flexibility needed in a real world Information Security model.
CONCLUSION
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In an area of IS research severely limited by the lack of a strong IS Security theory that is coercive and does not disregard the
importance of the information systems, its users and the organizational environment, it is imperative that an ontological
approach focused on gaining a deep understanding of organizational security would be the first step in the right direction.
Since it is impossible to know everything there is to know about security, and because it is impossible to predict the next
critical security incident, or where personal motivations condense into dubious security concerns, a devotion to understanding
patterns, rules, direction and internal rhythm of organizations will offer an imagery of a singular reality that can be captured
in a cohesive security model. Identifying the deep structure properties of IS security will therefore help to better understand
the underlying phenomena that characterize real IS security expectation.
Motivation for this research stems from the potential to elucidate deep structures of IS security in a way that it models real
expectations of information security by following a treatment similar to that established by Wand and Webber (1990) in
characterizing the deep structure of information systems. The model presented in the paper provides a conceptual view of an
IS security design model based on this exposition. Deep structure offers a rich understanding of IS security manifestations by
combining all the aspects of real world IS security that will help to attain higher levels of effectiveness in securing the
valuable resources of an organization. Conceptualizing the properties of IS security model by applying the three models of
deep structure suggests an organizational security design that uses surface information, interprets deep structure
consequences and applies the right technical solutions. The conceptual model presented in this paper is flexible to
accommodate the changes that an organization go through on a regular basis and provide a means to preserve security of
resources without being wedged into one of the many rigid security models that is unsuited to meet the challenges of fast
changing internal and external security threats. By drawing parallels to the linguistics of Information Systems deep structure,
the model allows deep structure information to arise automatically in all applied IS security situations.
Finally, it is pertinent to point out that deep structure analysis of information systems proposed by Wand and Weber has its
own set of limitations. It falls short in its modeling power primarily due to the lack of a well defined ontology that allows
“semantic modeling” of the domain of discourse (Wand and Weber, 1990). IS security, on the other hand, is a specialized
topic well suited for a deep structure analysis mainly due to two important reasons. 1) the mélange of specific external events
and consequent internal events are well studied, documented and made public by numerous security response teams such as
CERT/CC, CIS, CSRC and NSA (see references 6,8,16 and 18) and 2) the need for developing well defined taxonomies that
classify attacks, incidents and vulnerabilities has been recognized and commercial and federal bodies have joined hands in
addressing this issue (John Howard, 1997). Continuing research will focus on developing ontological constructs that can
describe the three models within the deep structure and develop vocabularies that depict the four requirements of the state-
tracking model as well as the event states of the decomposition model.
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